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Abstract—Adversarial examples (AEs) are images that can
mislead deep neural network (DNN) classifiers via introducing
slight perturbations into original images. Recent work has shown
that detecting AEs can be more effective against AEs than
preventing them from being generated. However, the state-of-the-
art AE detection still shows a high false positive rate, thereby
rejecting a considerable amount of normal images. To address
this issue, we propose HAWKEYE, which is a separate neural
network that analyzes the output layer of the DNN, and detects
AEs. HAWKEYE’s AE detector utilizes a quantized version of
an input image as a reference, and is trained to distinguish the
variation characteristics of the DNN output on an input image
from the DNN output on its reference image. We also show
that cascading our AE detectors that are trained for different
quantization step sizes can drastically reduce a false positive
rate, while keeping a detection rate high.
Index Terms—deep neural network, adversarial example, de-
tection, false positive
I. INTRODUCTION
Image classification problems have achieved great success
using deep neural networks (DNNs). However, recent work has
reported that DNN classifiers have a security issue such that
small perturbations to the input that humans may not recognize
can drastically change their output [1]–[3]. This security
vulnerability is critical, since it means that for example, an
adversary can make an autonomous vehicle mis-recognize a
stop sign as a yield sign [4].
Such perturbed inputs are called adversarial examples
(AEs). Adversaries can indeed make AEs with minimal per-
turbation, utilizing the gradient of the training cost function or
the DNN model output (see Section II) [1], [5], [6]. In order to
defend against AEs, there have been many solutions proposed
[1], [3], [7], [8]. Most of these defense mechanisms are
modifying training methods or DNN architectures to hide the
gradients near input data points so that adversaries get harder
to generate AEs. However, these methods are not effective
enough to prevent AEs from being generated, especially when
the perturbation level is high (though still not recognizable
to humans) or when AEs are made using a substitute model
with the same input and output formats, but with different
architecture, initialization, or training methods, i.e., in so-
called black-box attack methods [4], [9], [10].
Due to this limitation of existing defenses, recent work has
turned to detecting AEs rather than making the DNN be robust
against creating AEs [11]–[14]. Detecting AEs is usually done
by finding statistical outliers or training separate sub-networks
that can distinguish between AEs and normal images. The
state-of-the-art for detecting AEs, Feature Squeezing (FS) [14]
can achieve a high detection rate (DR), but it comes at a
high false positive rate (FPR), thereby rejecting a considerable
fraction of benign images.
To reduce the FPR, while keeping a high DR, we propose
HAWKEYE, which is a separate neural network that detects
AEs at the output layer of the application DNN. For a given
input image x, HAWKEYE analyzes the difference in the DNN
outputs, denoted by Z(x) = G(x)−G(xq), where G(x) is a
DNN output when fed with x and G(xq) is the one when
fed with its reference image xq . Here, the reference image is
the one that is created from an input image to be insensitive
to the perturbation noise added by adversaries. Thus, whether
or not an input image x contains the perturbation noise, the
reference image xq can stay almost the same. In order to create
a reliable reference image, we apply quantization to an input
image, i.e., our reference image is the quantized version of an
input image. Quantization is a widely used method to remove
noise in image or signals in general [14], [15]. We co-opt it
to detect AEs.
When an AE denoted by x∗ enters into the DNN, we have
Z(x∗) = G(x∗) − G(x∗q). Our key idea is that the vectors
Z(x) and Z(x∗) will have very different patterns, for many
possible (x, x∗) combinations. The difference in patterns can
be detected by our separate neural network that we called the
AE detector or AED in short. HAWKEYE’s AED is trained to
distinguish such variations in Z(x) from when the input x is
normal to when x is an AE. We find that with the right choice
of the quantization step size, we can nullify the malicious noise
if any and have a good reference image, which, in turn, leads
to good performance of the AED.
In HAWKEYE, we also propose to use cascading AEDs
that are trained using different quantization step sizes. Here,
cascading means that we ask multiple AEDs and decide that an
input image is an AE, only when all AEDs agree unanimously.
Different step sizes may lead to different characteristics in
Z(x) (see Figure 5), and thus each AED based on a specific
step size may learn something different about the same set
of normal images and corresponding AEs. Hence, cascading
AEDs of various step sizes can increase our confidence when
we raise a flag for a potential AE and thus further reduce
FPR. We find empirically that training multiple AEDs with
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different quantization steps and even with the same training
corpus reduces the correlation among them and cascading such
AEDs reduces the FPR without degrading the DR.
We claim to make the following contributions here:
1) We create a novel way to detect an AE, which does not
rely on any specific characteristic of the image or its
modification. Rather it relies on creating a reference quan-
tized image and passing both the original image and the
quantized image through the same application DNN. We
show that using a vector representation of the difference is
highly effective in telling apart benign versus adversarial
images. We use an appropriately trained neural network
for detecting the difference.
2) To further reduce FPR, we propose cascading AEDs that
are trained for different quantization step sizes. We see
that by intelligently choosing the different quantization
steps, we can produce variants of AEDs, such that cas-
caded detection can significantly reduce an FPR com-
pared to the FPR of an individual AED, while keeping a
DR high.
3) We create our AED and evaluate on two widely used
datasets, MNIST [16] and ImageNet [17]. We show
that compared to a recent state-of-the-art detector called
Feature Squeezing (FS) [14], HAWKEYE achieves a much
lower FPR (3.8% in MNIST and 18% in ImageNet) for
the same high DR (near 100%). Further, by cascading two
detectors, our FPR is reduced by 20X in MNIST and by
2X in ImageNet.
Our AED is a separate, simple neural network that does
not require any modification to the target DNN. Due to the
difficulty of training an application DNN from scratch, this is
often a desired characteristic. Note that like other AE detection
methods, HAWKEYE is orthogonal to prior work whose focus
is modifying a DNN to be robust against AEs by gradient
masking. Thus, it can be used together with such defense
mechanisms to achieve better protection.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II first reviews
popular methods to generate AEs and the state-of-the-art AE
detection scheme, introducing notations and concepts we use.
Then, we propose our solution in Section III. Experimental
results are given in Section IV, and miscellaneous important
things to consider are discussed in Section V. In Section VI,
we describe the previous work that is related, but not directly
overlapped to our work. Lastly, we conclude in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Classification problem
We consider a classification problem using a DNN model
as shown in Figure 1. For an image x, the DNN computes a
logits vector G(x) ∈ RK that is a non-normalized prediction,
where K denotes the number of classes. Then, G(x) is
ordinarily passed to a softmax function that normalizes it,
producing a probability vector F (x) ∈ [0, 1]K that estimates
the probability of each of the K classes. The F (x) is a model
DNN𝑥𝑥 𝐺𝐺 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾
argmax𝐿𝐿 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝐾𝐾}
Images Logits vectors
Predicted class labels
𝐹𝐹 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 0,1 𝐾𝐾Probability vectors softmax
Fig. 1: A general framework of classification problems.
output trained by minimizing the average of the cost function
J(x, y) that computes the cross entropy as:
J(x, y) = −
∑
∀i
[Y (x)]i log[F (x)]i, (1)
where y ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} is an integer representing the true
class label of x, Y (x) denotes a one-hot vector that has 1
at the index corresponding to y and 0 otherwise, and [V ]i
means the i-th element of a vector V . Thus, minimizing
J(x, y) means that we try to shape F (x) in such a way that
[F (x)]y > [F (x)]j for any j 6= y. The label predicted by a
classifier is L(x), which is the index of the largest probability,
i.e.,
L(x) = arg max
i∈{1,2,...,K}
[F (x)]i. (2)
When L(x) matches the true index y, we say that the predic-
tion is correct.
B. Adversarial examples
An adversarial example (AE), denoted by x∗, is one that
alters a given input x as:
x∗ = x+ δ, (3)
where δ is the perturbation noise added by adversaries such
that L(x+ δ) 6= L(x). That is, the adversarial example x∗ is
the one that perturbs x to mislead x’s class label. In order not
to be detected by human eyes or by simpler threshold-based
detectors, the magnitude of δ is typically chosen to be as small
as possible.
C. How to generate adversarial examples
Here, we describe representative methods to generate AEs,
which we use in our experiments.1
• Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) by [1] perturbs all
input pixels by the same quantity  in the direction of a
gradient sign, i.e.,
x∗ = x+  sign
(
∂J(x, y)
∂x
)
, (4)
where sign(v) is 1 if v > 0, -1 if v < 0, and 0 if v = 0. In
other words, FGSM attempts to make an AE by adding
a noise to each pixel in the direction that maximizes
the increment in the cost function. The value of  is
chosen to be a multiple of 0, which corresponds to the
1We also considered other recent methods, but they were not effective in
generating AEs. See more detail in Section IV-C.
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magnitude of one-bit change in a pixel. We use the term
“perturbation level” for .
• Iterative FGSM (I-FGSM) by [2] iteratively applies
FGSM (say, N times) with the minimal amount of
perturbation at a time as follows:
xn+1 = Clip
{
xn + 0sign
(
∂J(xn, y)
∂xn
)}
, (5)
with x0 = x and xN = x∗. Here, Clip{·} denotes
a pixel-wise clipping operation, which ensures that the
pixel value stays in the -vicinity of the original value,
and in the valid range. The value of N is heuristically set
as min(/0+4, 1.25/0) in [2] to incur a similar level
of total perturbation, compared to FGSM. The I-FGSM
usually creates AEs more successfully than FGSM for the
same  because it can fine-tune the perturbation in one
iteration based on the result from the previous iteration.
D. Adversarial example transferability
It was shown in [9] that AEs crafted to mislead a DNN
often also mislead a substitute model of the DNN (e.g., of
different initialization or architecture). This property is called
the adversarial example transferability, and means that it is
possible to generate AEs using a substitute model and perform
a misclassification attack on a machine learning system with-
out access to the target model. Such an attack is referred to as
a black-box attack. A recent work [4] demonstrated black-box
attacks in the scenario where adversaries cannot even access
the training dataset.
Thus, in our evaluation, we will consider two classes of
attacks—the black-box attack and the white-box attack. They
are mainly distinguished by where the adversarial examples
are constructed, assuming that the training dataset is always
accessible. We formally define our distinction between them
as follows:
Definition 1: Black-box attacks are the attacks that fool
a target model by adversarial examples made on a substitute
model. The adversaries do not know the internal parameters
of the target DNN. However, using the same training data set,
they can train their own DNN model so that they can construct
the gradients of the target model with high similarity.
Definition 2: White-box attacks are the attacks that attempt
to mislead the target DNN using the adversarial examples
crafted on the target model itself. The adversaries are assumed
to have access to the target DNN and thus be able to compute
the gradients of the target.
Most existing defenses that hide the gradient perform poorly
against black-box attacks, although they are quite effective
against white-box attacks [4], [5], [10], [18]. This is because
a substitute model can have the decision boundary that is
quite similar to that of the target model [19]. The adversary
simply reconstructs the gradients using a substitute model, thus
bypassing the gradient masking employed by such defenses.
a
b
c
Distibution of the test statistic
when an image is normal
Distibution of the test statistic
when an image is an AE
Decision threshold
Fig. 2: General relationship between the detection rate and
false positive rate. The detection rate is the sum of the areas
b and c, and the false positive rate is the sum of the areas a
and b. Reducing the decision threshold increases the detection
rate, but the false positive rate also increases.
E. Feature Squeezing: State-of-the-art for detecting adversar-
ial examples
The recent work, Feature Squeezing (FS) [14] has proposed
to use the squeezed input to detect AE. The squeezed input is
the one with pixels of a reduced color bit depth, or the one
that is spatially smoothed by blur filters, thereby being less
sensitive to the perturbation noise added by adversaries. FS
computes two predictions — one from the target DNN model
with the original input and the second from the same DNN
model with the squeezed input, and then performs a threshold
test on the L1 distance between the two predictions. If the L1
distance is larger than a threshold, FS decides that the input
image is an AE, otherwise it is benign.
The intuition behind this design is that an adversarial
modification will affect the original image but not the squeezed
input image. We leverage this same insight. FS is reported to
achieve a high DR for AEs, e.g., the perfect DR for FPR = 0.05
for the MNIST dataset and DR = 0.64 for the same FPR for
the ImageNet dataset. However, its decision threshold needs to
be fixed targeting a particular perturbation level. It performs
poorly for perturbation levels that the threshold is not targeted
for. In order to maintain the high DR for a wide range of
perturbations, the value of the threshold can be chosen small
enough, but this inevitably incurs a high FPR, as Figure 2
explains. For example, as we can see later in Figure 8, one
threshold of FS can achieve a DR of 0.91 with an FPR of 0.038
at the perturbation level  = 320. However, this decision
threshold gets a DR of 0.58 when the perturbation level goes
down to  = 20. When we increase the DR at  = 20 to
0.90 by reducing the threshold, FS suffers from an FPR of
0.179. The high DR and low FPR values reported in the paper
were obtained with large perturbation levels (which were left
implicit in the paper), which may be detectable by a human-in-
the-loop or simple threshold-based detectors. Fundamentally,
the drawback of FS is that there is a rigid mapping of the
perturbation level used to generate the AE and the L1 norm
threshold and we show that using a richer detector can lead
to more precise detection across a wide range of perturbation
levels.
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DNN𝑥𝑥
Images
DNN𝑥𝑥𝑞𝑞
Quantized
images
𝐺𝐺 𝑥𝑥
𝐺𝐺 𝑥𝑥𝑞𝑞
+
+
_
𝑍𝑍 𝑥𝑥 = 𝐺𝐺 𝑥𝑥 − 𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥𝑞𝑞) AE detector
𝐷𝐷(𝑥𝑥)
• 𝑥𝑥 is an AE,    if 𝐷𝐷 𝑥𝑥 > 𝑇𝑇
• 𝑥𝑥 is normal, if 𝐷𝐷 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑇𝑇
Fig. 3: Overview of HAWKEYE’s workflow.
Original
x
FGSM I-FGSM
xq
(a) MNIST [16] when  = 320 and s = 128.
Original
x
FGSM I-FGSM
xq
(b) ImageNet [17] when  = 80 and s = 64.
Fig. 4: An example of quantization on the input image. The
second column is the quantized version of the image in the first
column. We can see that after quantization, a normal image
and its corresponding AE become more similar to each other.
III. SOLUTION APPROACH
A. Reference inputs
Figure 3 shows the overall workflow of HAWKEYE. For a
given image x, we consider a quantized image xq , which is
made by quantizing each pixel of x with step size s. Typically,
a pixel of an image is represented in 8 bits, ranging in value
over [0, 255]. Thus, quantizing with step size s = 128, for
TABLE I: AE detector architectures in MNIST and ImageNet.
Here, FC denote the fully connected layer, where neurons have
connections to all activations in the previous layer, as seen in
regular neural networks.
Layer number Layer type Activation Output shape(MNIST)
Output shape
(ImageNet)
Input 10 1,000
1 FC Relu 10 1,000
2 FC Relu 10 100
3 FC Relu 10 10
4 FC Sigmoid 1 1
example, means that a pixel of xq is represented as either 0 or
128, which is of 1-bit information. In general, after quantiza-
tion with step size s, a pixel value v is represented as sbv/sc,
where b·c denotes a floor function. The motivation to use
such a quantized input is that as Figure 4 exemplifies, normal
image and its corresponding AE become more similar after
quantization, since the quantization process may nullify the
noise added by adversaries that is smaller than the quantization
step size s.2 Thus, the quantized input xq can play a role as
an invariant reference of an image, regardless of the existence
of malicious additive noise.
B. Adversarial example detector
To utilize xq as a reference, we compute G(x) and G(xq),
which are the logits vectors of the same DNN for the inputs
x and xq , respectively, and take a difference between the two
as Z(x) = G(x) − G(xq). This difference vector Z(x) of
length K (i.e., the number of classes) is the input to our AED.
The AED is a separate neural network, consisting of fully
connected layers and making the detector output D(x) ∈ [0, 1]
by a sigmoid activation function. Table I shows the detail of
AED architecture. We train the AED in such a way that the
detector output D(x) becomes high if x is an AE, and D(x)
becomes low if x is normal. Then, we perform a threshold
test seeing if D(x) > T , where T is our threshold, and if this
holds true, we mark the image as an AE. An important design
point is that the AED’s neural network is far simpler than the
2We also tested the smoothed input applying blur filters to see if it can
act as a reference, as introduced in the FS paper. However, its performance
was far worse than that with quantization. Thus we omit those results in our
paper.
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application DNN we are trying to protect. Thus, the design
and the training effort for the AED are minimal.
In the detailed look at the AED, we maximize the average
of the following cost function Jd(x) to train it:
Jd(x) = (1−D(x)) +D(x∗), (6)
where x∗ is defined as in (4) with the value of the perturbation
level  that is randomly varying over the interval [0, max].
That is, for each input x, we create x∗, feed Z(x) and Z(x∗)
to the AED to form (6), and maximize it. Here, max is the
perturbation level beyond which the AE is far too distorted
from the original image and thus is easily recognizable by
humans. Since x∗ is a potential AE crafted from x, what we
want ideally is that D(x∗) = 1 and D(x) = 0. Training the
detector by maximizing the average of the cost function Jd(x)
means adjusting the internal weight parameters of the detector
neural network towards achieving this ideal goal. Of course,
the value of D(x) seldom becomes exactly 0 or 1 in tests,
regardless of whether x is a normal image or an AE. Rather,
D(x) lies in between 0 and 1. Thus, we use a threshold T
(setting T = 0.5 by default) and decide that x is an AE only
if D(x) > T . Thus, the value of T acts as a knob to control the
trade-off between DR and FPR. A high value of T decreases
FPR at the cost of lowering DR.
Note that the quantized input is equivalent to one of the
squeezed inputs that uses the reduced bit depth in FS [14].
However, FS considers only the L1 norm of Z ′(x) = F (x)−
F (xq) for threshold testing, thereby using a single scalar
value and losing information relative to our design of taking
the difference vector. Taking the difference after softmax
normalization, i.e., F (x) − F (xq) instead of G(x) − G(xq),
also loses information and reduces the detectability of FS. In
contrast, we use the whole of Z(x), and analyze the subtle
variation across all elements of Z(x) in the AED to flag an
image as adversarial or benign.
In order to train an AED, we use the same training images
as were used for training the application DNN. For each such
data point (which is by definition benign—call this as x), we
create a set of AEs varying the perturbation level (using the
standard adversarial example generation techniques described
in Section II-C—call this the set of x∗’s). We now train the
AED maximizing the cost function given in (6).
It is also worth noting that our AED is a totally separated
neural network that is attached to the output layer of the target
DNN. That is, we do not require to modify the target DNN
itself. This is often a desired characteristic, since in many use
cases, transfer learning is used, which utilizes a DNN model
that is already trained by someone else. This has become
popular due to the difficulty of training a DNN from scratch.
C. Cascading AE detectors of various quantization step sizes
Even for the same AE x∗, characteristics on Z(x∗) may
differ depending on the quantization step size s. Figure 5
shows how Z(x∗) can be different in terms of Pearson
correlation coefficients (PCCs) according to the step sizes
in MNIST dataset [16]. In general, the PCC between two
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Fig. 5: Heatmaps showing Pearson correlation coefficients
(PCCs) between Z(x∗)’s of different quantization step sizes
in MNIST dataset [16]. The value of a PCC is an average of
10,000 images, and x∗ is generated by (4). We can see that the
PCC between different step sizes is usually much lower than
1, meaning that the same x∗ may lead to a different Z(x∗)
for a different step size.
𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠1 𝑥𝑥
AE detector
(step 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑠𝑠1) 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠1(𝑥𝑥)
𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠2 𝑥𝑥
AE detector
(step 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑠𝑠2) 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠2(𝑥𝑥)
(a) Adversarial example detectors are
trained with different values of the quan-
tization step s.
𝑥𝑥
No
𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠1 𝑥𝑥 > 𝑇𝑇?
𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠2 𝑥𝑥 > 𝑇𝑇?
No
Yes
Yes
𝑥𝑥 is normal
𝑥𝑥 is normal
𝑥𝑥 is an AE
(b) An example of cascading two detec-
tors of different values for the step s.
Fig. 6: Cascading detectors that use s1 and s2 as the quanti-
zation step size.
vectors becomes 1 when two vectors are perfectly correlated
and 0 when there is no correlation. When PCC= −1, it means
that the two vectors are perfectly correlated with the opposite
sign. Let us denote Z(x∗) for the step size s by Zs(x∗).
Then, in our case, any positive PCC lower than 1 between
Zs1(x
∗) and Zs2(x
∗) implies that Zs1(x
∗) and Zs2(x
∗) may
look different correspondingly to the magnitude of the PCC.
Note that negative PCCs also mean that Zs1(x
∗) and Zs2(x
∗)
are different enough, since they are the inputs to the AED,
which is a non-linear system made by a neural network, where
inputs of opposite sign typically result in completely different
outcomes. Thus, Figure 5 results, where the PCC between
different step sizes is usually much lower than 1, suggest to
us that for the same x∗, we can have various forms of Z(x∗)
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as the input to our AED by changing the step size.
Using such a characteristic of Z(x∗), we can consider
multiple variations of the AED, each of which uses a different
step size, in order to decrease FPR of the overall HAWKEYE
system. All variations of the AED using a different step size
are trained experiencing a different form of Z(x∗). A cascade
of AEDs is used in parallel. Only when every AED in the
cascade designates an input as adversarial does HAWKEYE
flag it as an AE.
Figure 6 shows an example of cascading two AEDs that
use s1 and s2 as the quantization step sizes. Each detector
is separately trained using its own step size, on the same x’s
and correspondingly generated x∗’s. Then, any given image is
double-checked by each of detectors and it is only classified
as an AE when both detectors think it is an AE. Note that in
this case, we have the following if the AEDs are completely
independent:
DR = (DR of detector 1)× (DR of detector 2),
FPR = (FPR of detector 1)× (FPR of detector 2).
That is, when we cascade detectors, the total FPR is the
product of FPRs of all detectors, and thus it goes down.
However, the total DR is also the product of DRs of all
detectors. Thus, unless each detector achieves DR = 1, the
total DR also decreases. For this reason, we only cascade
detectors that have a DR higher than 0.99. In practice, the
lack of correlation among the different AEDs in a cascade
helps us achieve this high DR, low FPR goal.
IV. EXPERIMENT
In the section, we first introduce what datasets and DNN
models are used, and see how successfully AEs can be
generated in the models. Then, until Section IV-F, we evaluate
the performance of HAWKEYE in comparison to FS against
white-box attacks. In Section IV-G, we see the performance
against black-box attacks. In Section IV-H, we also see how
well HAWKEYE performs against other types of distorted
images that can be generated by environmental effects on a
camera [20].
A. Datasets
In our evaluations, we consider two popular datasets for
image classification tasks, MNIST [16] and ImageNet [17].
MNIST is a database of handwritten digit images of 28×28
pixels in one channel, and labels are integers from 0 to 9, (thus
K = 10). It has a training set of 60,000 images, and a test set
of 10,000 examples. ImageNet is a large visual database of
over 14 million color images. Classification task is to choose
one out of 1,000 labels. Thus, the value of K is 1,000 here.
We use its images after preprocessing to 224×224 pixels in
three channels via resizing and cropping. We use the ILSVRC
2012 curation [21] of ImageNet that has 1.28 million images
for training and 50 thousand images, which are not overlapped
to the training images, for test purpose.
TABLE II: DNN models used for each dataset in evaluations.
Accuracy here is calculated over the test portion of each
dataset.
Dataset Model Top-1 accuracy Top-5 accuracy
MNIST 4-layer CNN [22] 0.99 -
ImageNet ResNet-18 [23] 0.66 0.84
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Perturbation level  (unit: 0)
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(a) MNIST.
2 4 8
Perturbation level  (unit: 0)
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
AS
R
FGSM
I-FGSM
(b) ImageNet.
Fig. 7: Attack success rate (ASR) at a given perturbation level
, when no defense mechanism is employed.
B. DNN models
We set up a DNN model for each dataset that can achieve
the state-of-the-art performance. For MNIST, we use a simple
convolutional neural network (CNN) that is a model given in
the Tensorflow tutorial [22]. It consists of two convolutional
layers and two fully connected layers. Training is done for
5 epochs using Adam optimizer [24] with learning rate =
0.0002. For ImageNet, we use a Residual Network of 18 layers
(ResNet-18) [23]. The image is resized with its shorter side
randomly sampled in [256, 480] for scale augmentation, and
then a 224×224 crop is randomly sampled from an image
or its horizontal flip. We train the ResNet-18 model for 20
epochs using Nesterov optimizer [25] with momentum= 0.9.
The learning rate starts from 0.1 and is divided by 10 when
the error plateaus. In both datasets, we use a mini-batch of
size 100. The classification performance of the DNN models
is shown in Table II, where the top-k accuracy means the rate
that one of top k predictions matches the true label. All the
rates in our paper, including the accuracies here, are calculated
using the test portion of each dataset.
C. Attack success rates without a defense
We considered four methods for generating AEs. Two are
FGSM and I-FGSM discussed in Section II and other two
are Jacobian-based saliency-map approach (JSMA) [6] and
Deepfool [26], which will be described in Section VI later as
related work. However, JSMA was not effective in generating
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TABLE III: Detector performance in “(detection rate, false positive rate)” according to the perturbation level  (unit: 0). AEs
are generated using FGSM.
(a) MNIST.

Step size s
2 4 8 16 32 64 128
2 (0.092, 0.048) (1.000, 0.093) (0.866, 0.082) (0.921, 0.026) (0.519, 0.022) (0.167, 0.038) (0.113, 0.051)
4 (0.194, 0.048) (0.218, 0.093) (0.995, 0.082) (0.984, 0.026) (0.944, 0.022) (0.628, 0.038) (0.266, 0.051)
8 (0.189, 0.048) (0.188, 0.093) (0.089, 0.082) (1.000, 0.026) (1.000, 0.022) (0.982, 0.038) (0.706, 0.051)
16 (0.181, 0.048) (0.181, 0.093) (0.095, 0.082) (0.072, 0.026) (1.000, 0.022) (1.000, 0.038) (0.994, 0.051)
32 (0.232, 0.048) (0.198, 0.093) (0.070, 0.082) (0.047, 0.026) (0.018, 0.022) (1.000, 0.038) (1.000, 0.051)
(b) ImageNet.

Step size s
2 4 8 16 32 64 128
2 (0.633, 0.291) (0.678, 0.272) (0.719, 0.217) (0.725, 0.145) (0.626, 0.100) (0.722, 0.174) (0.674, 0.195)
4 (0.847, 0.294) (0.908, 0.277) (0.886, 0.219) (0.909, 0.151) (0.892, 0.103) (0.929, 0.181) (0.924, 0.197)
8 (0.941, 0.292) (0.972, 0.273) (0.971, 0.209) (0.937, 0.144) (0.972, 0.100) (0.991, 0.183) (0.993, 0.192)
2 4 8 16 32
Perturbation level  (unit: 0)
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
DR
FGSM (Hawkeye, FPR=0.038)
I-FGSM (Hawkeye, FPR=0.038)
FGSM (FS, FPR=0.038)
I-FGSM (FS, FPR=0.038)
FGSM (FS, FPR=0.179)
I-FGSM (FS, FPR=0.179)
(a) Detection rates in MNIST.
2 4 8 16 32
Perturbation level  (unit: 0)
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
AS
R-
AD
FGSM (Hawkeye, FPR=0.038)
I-FGSM (Hawkeye, FPR=0.038)
FGSM (FS, FPR=0.038)
I-FGSM (FS, FPR=0.038)
FGSM (FS, FPR=0.179)
I-FGSM (FS, FPR=0.179)
(b) Attack success rates after detection in MNIST.
2 4 8
Perturbation level  (unit: 0)
0.0
0.5
1.0
DR
FGSM (Hawkeye, FPR=0.182)
I-FGSM (Hawkeye, FPR=0.182)
FGSM (FS, FPR=0.182)
I-FGSM (FS, FPR=0.182)
FGSM (FS, FPR=0.808)
I-FGSM (FS, FPR=0.808)
(c) Detection rates in ImageNet.
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Perturbation level  (unit: 0)
0.0
0.5
1.0
AS
R-
AD
FGSM (Hawkeye, FPR=0.182)
I-FGSM (Hawkeye, FPR=0.182)
FGSM (FS, FPR=0.182)
I-FGSM (FS, FPR=0.182)
FGSM (FS, FPR=0.808)
I-FGSM (FS, FPR=0.808)
(d) Attack success rates after detection in ImageNet.
Fig. 8: Detection rates and attack success rates after detection.
AEs at the same perturbation levels as FGSM or I-FGSM, and
it took too long time and too much memory as said in [14].
Deepfool was good at generating AEs, but as reported in [14],
the generated AEs were far too distorted from their original
images and thus they can be easily detected by humans. For
this reason, we dropped JSMA and Deepfool and use FGSM
and I-FGSM in our evaluations.
For the selected attack methods, Figure 7 shows the attack
success rate (ASR) at a given perturbation level , when the
DNN is used without any defense mechanism. ASR is the
ratio of the perturbed images that are misclassified by a DNN
model to the total number of images being attempted. In case
of ImageNet, we compute the ASR, being associated with top-
5 accuracy. That is, we regard the perturbed image an AE
when none of the top 5 predictions is the true label. This
is because with the top-1 accuracy in ImageNet, the ASR
is meaninglessly high [5]. The figure shows that I-FGSM is
in general a stronger attack than FGSM. We can also see
that ImageNet is much more sensitive to AEs than MNIST,
showing that I-FGSM can reach almost 100% ASR even at
the perturbation level of only  = 80.
D. AE detector performance according to the step size
In order to choose the best value of the quantization step
size, we train the AED varying the step size s, and evaluate the
performance at multiple perturbation levels. Table III shows
the results of such experiments in terms of (DR, FPR) when
our decision threshold T is 0.5. When training the AED, we
set max as 320 for MNIST and 80 for ImageNet. As we can
see from Figure 4, AEs are usually recognizable by humans
before the perturbation level reaches max.
From the table, we can first notice that in both MNIST
and ImageNet, the best DR is achieved only when the step
size is larger than the perturbation level being tested. This
supports our intuition that quantization process may nullify
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FPR
0.0
0.5
1.0
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FGSM (Hawkeye)
I-FGSM (Hawkeye)
FGSM (FS)
I-FGSM (FS)
(a) ROC in MNIST when  = 320.
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FPR
0.0
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FGSM (Hawkeye)
I-FGSM (Hawkeye)
FGSM (FS)
I-FGSM (FS)
(b) ROC in ImageNet when  = 80.
Fig. 9: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for HAWKEYE and Feature Squeezing.
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0.75
1.00
DR
FGSM (single)
FGSM (cascaded)
I-FGSM (single)
I-FGSM (cascaded)
(a) Detection rate comparison in MNIST.
Here, the single AED is of FPR= 0.038
and cascading AEDs achieves FPR=
0.002.
2 4 8 16 32
Perturbation level  (unit: 0)
0.00
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0.10
0.15
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R-
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FGSM (Hawkeye (cascaded), FPR=0.002)
I-FGSM (Hawkeye (cascaded), FPR=0.002)
(b) Attack success rates after detection in MNIST.
2 4 8
Perturbation level  (unit: 0)
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
DR
FGSM (single)
FGSM (cascaded)
I-FGSM (single)
I-FGSM (cascaded)
(c) Detection rate comparison in Ima-
geNet. Here, the single AED is of FPR=
0.182 and cascading AEDs achieves FPR=
0.088.
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Perturbation level  (unit: 0)
0.0
0.5
1.0
AS
R-
AD
FGSM (Hawkeye (cascaded), FPR=0.088)
I-FGSM (Hawkeye (cascaded), FPR=0.088)
(d) Attack success rates after detection in ImageNet.
Fig. 10: Detection rates and attack success rates after detection of HAWKEYE cascading two steps of AEDs.
the malicious noise that is smaller than the quantization step
size, and thus the quantized input xq can be an invariant
reference of an image. When the step size is smaller than
or comparable to the perturbation level, the quantized input
xq may not serve as a good reference, and thus, the AED
experiences the difficulty in distinguishing between normal
images and AEs. However, we can also see that too large step
size compared to the perturbation level can decrease the DR.
Therefore, one specific value for the step size cannot achieve
the best performance for all the range of perturbation levels.
Thus, in practice, we suggest to use the step size that performs
well for the large perturbation levels (e.g., s = 64 or s = 128
in our evaluations). The rationale behind this is that for the
low perturbation levels, the ASR for the DNN without any
defense is also low and thus after AE detection, the success
rates of attacks may become much lower even though the
DR of the AED is not that high (see Figure 8). Further, our
AED can be used together with existing defenses that hide the
gradients of DNN models, which protect the DNN well for
low perturbation levels [5]. For this reason, we will focus on
studying the performance of our AED using step size s = 64
hereafter, unless otherwise stated.
E. Performance comparison with Feature Squeezing
Figure 8 shows the comparison results between HAWKEYE
and FS, the state-of-the-art detector for AE from 2018 [14].
For this experiment, we use the step size s = 64 and thus, as
shown in Table III, HAWKEYE has FPR= 0.038 for MNIST
and FPR= 0.182 for ImageNet. For fair comparison, we
found two decision thresholds for FS in each dataset: one
that achieves the same FPR as HAWKEYE and the other that
achieves a comparably high DR. From Figures 8a and 8c,
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(a) Detection rates in MNIST.
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(b) Attack success rates after detection in MNIST.
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(c) Detection rates in ImageNet.
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(d) Attack success rates after detection in ImageNet.
Fig. 11: Detection rates and attack success rates after detection when AEs are crafted on a substitute model (i.e., black-box
attacks).
we can see that FS achieves a significantly lower DR than
HAWKEYE at the same FPR. If we try the other decision
threshold for FS to achieve the high DR, then FS’s FPR goes
up to FPR= 0.179 for MNIST and FPR= 0.808 for ImageNet,
both of which are unacceptably high. The receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve in Figure 9 shows that in general,
HAWKEYE outperforms FS in such a way that HAWKEYE
achieves a higher DR at the same FPR, or it achieves a lower
FPR at the same DR. The difference is much more significant
for the larger and more challenging ImageNet. The area under
the curve (AUC) for ROC curves is 0.99 for HAWKEYE and
0.96 for FS in MNIST, and 0.97 for HAWKEYE and 0.43 for
FS in ImageNet.
Figures 8b and 8d show the attack success rates after de-
tection (ASR-AD), which is the ratio of maliciously perturbed
images that pass through a detector without being detected as
AE and mislead a DNN model, to the total number of images
being attempted. One may argue that this measure is more
important than DR because these are the examples that both
escape detection and finally cause an error in the application
DNN. We can first see that in general, HAWKEYE achieves a
much lower ASR-AD than FS. Second, we can also see that
even though the DR of HAWKEYE at the low perturbation level
is not as high as the DR at the high perturbation level, but it is
not a big issue in terms of ASR-AD. Since ASR itself is low
at the low perturbation level, not many AEs can be generated
at this level. Thus, even with DR that is much lower than 1,
the ASR-AD can still be quite low.
F. Performance of cascading AE detectors
We evaluate HAWKEYE when we cascade two AEDs of
s = 64 and s = 128, and Figure 10 shows the results. As
we have seen in Table III, the two step sizes s = 64 and
s = 128 achieve a very high DR that is 1 or almost close to 1
at the high perturbation level. Thus, cascading AEDs can still
maintain the high DR. We can see that cascading results in
an FPR that is significantly lower, as intended. In MNIST, the
FPR is 0.002, which was 0.038 for a single AED of s = 64;
thus the 2-cascade achieves an FPR reduction of about 20X.
In ImageNet, we now have FPR = 0.088, which was 0.182
for a single AED of s = 64, a reduction of about 2X.
On the flip side, cascading AEDs causes a DR at the low
perturbation level to be too low. In MNIST, this is not a big
issue, since the ASR is also very low. We can see that ASR-
AD in MNIST is bounded below 0.04 over all perturbation
levels. However, in ImageNet, we can see that the ASR-AD
at the perturbation level  = 20 is around 0.4, which is
unacceptably high. This is because in ImageNet, the ASR
is already above 0.85 at  = 20 as seen in Figure 7. This
result suggests that in ImageNet, HAWKEYE should be used in
combination with another defense mechanism that can protect
at low perturbation levels. For example, adversarial training
[2], [5] is especially effective at low perturbation levels. It can
control the ASR at  = 20 to be much less 0.1 in ImageNet
[5]. Thus, when combined with adversarial training, cascaded
AEDs in HAWKEYE will achieve a consistently low ASR-
AD over the entire range of perturbation levels, while it can
significantly lower FPR compared to a single AED.
G. Performance comparison with Feature Squeezing for black-
box attacks
So far we have seen the performance of HAWKEYE when
AEs are generated using the target DNN model, i.e, white-
box attacks. Now, we evaluate how HAWKEYE performs in
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(a) MNIST.
(b) ImageNet.
Fig. 12: An example of environmental effects on camera in-
puts. When a DNN classifier is used for autonomous vehicles,
these can physically occur to a camera. These are not AEs by
definition, but can mislead a DNN, effectively working as if
AEs.
comparison with FS when AEs are crafted using a substitute
model, i.e., black-box attacks. As a substitute model, we
consider the same DNN model that is trained with different
initialization. Existing defenses that hide the gradient of the
target DNN are typically less robust against such a substi-
tute model, especially when I-FGSM is used [5], [18]. For
evaluation, we used the detectors that have FPR= 0.038 for
MNIST and FPR= 0.182 for ImageNet when with white-
box attacks in Figure 8. The results of our experiment are
shown in Figure 11. We first notice that at many perturbation
levels, DR and ASR-AD for both HAWKEYE and FS become
worse than in Figure 8, but the difference is not significant.
For example, HAWKEYE’s DR at  = 80 in ImageNet was
0.987 at white-box attacks and here, it is 0.961, which is only
about 2% decrement. We also notice that an FPR may increase
when black-box attacks are performed, but not significantly.
As an example, black-box attacks cause HAWKEYE’s FPR
in ImageNet to increase to 0.212 from 0.182, which is 3%
difference. We think that this is the virtue of AE detection
approach as a defense. Unlike defense mechanisms based on
gradient masking, which are vulnerable to black-box attacks,
as has been repeatedly shown [27] defenses by detecting AEs
are robust against such black-box attacks. HAWKEYE, being a
defense mechanism in this category (detecting AEs), possesses
this benefit as does FS.
H. Detection of environmental effects
We now see if HAWKEYE can perform well against en-
vironmental effects that can physically happen to a camera
that creates input images to a DNN classifier, such as in
autonomous vehicles. As introduced in [20], we consider three
effects, brightness-reduced images (simulating images taken at
night time), occlusion by a noise box (simulating an attacker
TABLE IV: Detection rate of HAWKEYE for environmental
effects on camera inputs illustrated in Figure 12.
Reduced
brightness
Noise
box
Black
dots
MNIST 0.9866 0.9727 0.9489
ImageNet 0.822 0.856 0.778
or a water drop potentially blocking some parts of a camera),
and occlusion by multiple tiny black dots (simulating dirt
on camera lens). An example of each effect is shown in
Figure 12. These are not AEs by definition, but can mislead
a DNN prediction by the distortion on images that functions
effectively in a similar way to AEs. The reduced brightness
is created by deceasing all pixel values by l. The noise box
effect is made by adding n× n box at a random position and
the noise box is filled with random values over [−l, l]. The
black dots are made by adding w × w box whose pixels are
all zero at a random position l times.
Figure 12 is created with (l, n, w) = (64, 10, 1) in MNIST
and with (l, n, w) = (64, 40, 4) in ImageNet. Table IV shows
the DR of HAWKEYE in such conditions. We can see that
HAWKEYE achieves a DR of around 0.95 for MNIST and
a DR of around 0.8 for ImageNet. Although HAWKEYE is
not trained for such types of images, it can still detect them
well. This implies that HAWKEYE can work well against other
potential AE generation methods as well as it can be used for
detecting such environmentally distorted images.
V. DISCUSSION
Our ResNet18 model used in ImageNet achieves top-1 and
top-5 accuracies as 0.66 and 0.84, respectively, as shown in
Table II. These are slightly lower than those reported in [23],
where the top-1 accuracy= 0.69 and the top-5 accuracy= 0.89.
This difference mainly occurs because in [23], the accuracies
are computed by 10-crop testing that takes 10 different crops
from an image and classification scores are then combined to
determine the most likely class. The improvement in accura-
cies actually reduces ASR and ASR-AD. Thus, if we use a
better DNN model, like a better-tuned ResNet-18 or deeper
ResNets such as ResNet-152, then HAWKEYE’s ASR-AD is
expected to be further improved.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Other methods for creating adversarial examples
Jacobian-based saliency-map approach (JSMA) by [6] aims
at fooling a classification model into outputting a specific
target class t by iteratively perturbing one or two pixels at
a time. Since only one or two pixels change at a time, this
method takes a long time to create an AE (unusably long
for ImageNet images) compared to FGSM or I-FGSM [14],
[28], and the resulting AEs usually contain pixels with high
intensity, which can be relatively easily detected by humans.
JSMA also requires a huge amount of memory to compute a
Jacobian matrix [14]. For these reasons, we did not consider
it in our evaluation.
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Deepfool [26] is another untargeted attack method, creating
AEs with the assumption that a classifier is a linear model.
Since DNNs are not actually linear, Deepfool iterates a pro-
cess, where a DNN is first approximated to a linear model
and the minimum level of perturbation is decided for each
approximation. Although Deepfool can successfully mislead
DNNs, AEs created by it often look too distorted from their
original images, thus easily detectable by humans, as reported
in [14]. Thus, we exclude it from our evaluation.
B. Defenses by hiding gradients
The basis of the first generation defense mechanisms against
adversarial examples is what is often called gradient masking,
which attempts to hide a useful gradient (like ∂J(x,y)∂x or
∂[F (x)]t
∂x ) in the vicinity of the input data points. Below are
representative defenses of such a kind.
Contractive penalty was considered in [7], where as a
regularizer, ‖∂F (x)∂x ‖2 is added into the training cost. This is
intended to train a model, minimizing the norm of Jacobian
∂F (x)
∂x so that the gradient near input data points is reduced.
Adversarial training by [1] enhances robustness by exposing
a model to AEs in advance during the training phase. This is
usually achieved by modifying the cost function to Ja(x, y)
as
Ja(x, y) =(1− α)J(x, y)
+ αJ
(
x+ sign
(
∂J(x, y)
∂x
)
, y
)
, (7)
where 0 < α < 1. Namely, the second term based on an
AE generated by FGSM in (4) is considered at every step
of training as a regularizer. Adversarial training shows the
gradient masking effect [18], and also changes the decision
boundary by forcing an image x and an adversarial example
created from x to the same class.
Distillation is a recent advance in deep learning by [29],
which found that knowledge in a neural network can be
transferred to a smaller model. It was shown in [3] that a
distilled model can be more robust to adversarial examples
than its original model, and the robustness gets larger as we
use a higher value for the so-called distillation temperature
T in the training phase. However, [4] reported later that the
distilled model is weak against black-box attacks.
Saturating networks was proposed in [8], which encourages
activation functions to stay in the saturating regime of their
non-linearity (e.g., all-zero region for a Relu) by adding a
regularizer in the training cost. This is intended to make a
model be less sensitive to input perturbations.
The methods described above except adversarial training
later turned out to fail against black-box attacks [4], [10], since
the adversary can reconstruct the gradients using a substitute
model. Adversarial training is relatively robust against black-
box attacks, but its protection capacity drops rapidly with the
increase in the perturbation levels [5].
C. Defenses by detecting adversarial examples
Grosse et al. [11] proposed a statistical test to detect
AEs from training dataset using maximum mean discrepancy.
This method requires a large set of normal images and their
corresponding AEs, and is not capable of detecting individual
AEs. Thus, they also proposed detecting individual AEs by
adding an additional class to a DNN model, and train the
model to recognize AEs as this new class. However, it is
disadvantageous to require changes to the target DNN itself.
Metzen et al. [12] proposed attaching a CNN-based detector
at the middle layers of a DNN model. The detector is trained
in a supervised manner to classify an input to a normal image
or an AE. This requires a large set of AEs to be generated
offline for each perturbation level. Attaching a detector in the
middle layers also causes the input size to the detector is huge,
thereby requiring the detector itself is also another DNN to
fully extract the features from such a large input.
MagNet [27] also used a reference input to detect an AE.
It uses an autoencoder and compares the input image with
the autoencoder output. Since the autoencoder is supposed to
reconstruct a given input to the one that is smoothed over
possible additive noise, the output of the autoencoder plays a
role as a reference. However, training autoencoder to obtain a
faithful reconstruction is a challenging task, especially when
the inputs have a wide variety like in ImageNet. For this
reason, MagNet falls behind FS in ImageNet [14].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed HAWKEYE to detect Adversarial
Examples (AEs). Unlike the first generation defense methods
that apply gradient masking, HAWKEYE does not prevent
AEs from being generated. Rather, HAWKEYE attempts to
detect AEs by considering differences in the logit vector
generated by the application DNN for the original image and
a reference image generated from it. The reference image is
generated by quantizing the original image and we leverage
the fact that the quantized image is less sensitive to adversarial
modifications. HAWKEYE designs a separate neural network,
an adversarial example detector (AED), which can observe the
difference between the output of the application DNN with the
original image and the quantized image and classify whether
the original image is benign or adversarial. We also propose
cascading our AEDs that are trained with different quantization
step sizes. Cascading AEDs maintains the high DR of a
single AED but can reduce FPR dramatically. HAWKEYE is
complementary to prior work based on gradient masking and
can be used together to achieve better protection, especially at
low perturbation levels.
Our evaluation results using two widely used datasets,
MNIST and ImageNet, showed that compared to Feature
Squeezing, which is the state-of-the-art AE detection tech-
nique, HAWKEYE is superior in both DR and FPR, achieving
the ROC curves that are positioned higher than those of FS.
Compared to an individual AED, cascading our AEDs of step
sizes s = 64 and s = 128 could reduce the FPR by about
20X in MNIST and by about 2X in ImageNet. Experimental
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results also showed that HAWKEYE is not sensitive to black-
box attacks, achieving DR and FPR only slightly worse than
those in white-box attacks.
As future work, we will try to find other reference inputs
that may work better than quantization, thereby improving
detection performance, especially for the small perturbation
levels. Multi-modal inputs, such as dual camera used in
autonomous vehicles, are a promising avenue to create a good
reference input.
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